José G. Montalvo, Amedeo Piolatto and Josep Raya develop a fraud decision theory and test its implications with a unique Spanish dataset.
Cristina Bellés-Obrero, Antonio Cabrales, Sergi Jiménez-Martín and Judit Vall-Castello find that maternal vigilance compensates for the negative effects of a Spanish child labor reform.
Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel use data from a math contest to find out if competition has different effects on men and women.
Elena del Rey, Sergi Jiménez-Martín and Judit Vall-Castello explore the effects of a 1980 labor market reform in Spain that increased the statutory minimum working age.
Caterina Calsamiglia and Antonio Miralles show that the common mechanisms for allocating children according to their preferences may be limited whenever there are coarse priorities to break ties.